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One of the most provocative and profound openingphrases to a scholarly enquiry I have come across
is the question posed at the turn of the twentieth
century by the American historian and writer W.E.B. du
Bois, who asked ‘how does it feel to be a problem?’2 Du
Bois’s question was in reference to the sociology of race
in the United States. In later years his depiction of
‘double consciousness’ – the dialectical entwinement of
the subjective and objective experiences of political and
cultural processes – came to infuse postcolonial
thinking. But it is the essence of Du Bois’s question –
how we come to see and define something as a problem
– that has most piqued me in my studies of Africa’s
political economy over the years. Indeed, Du Bois’s
question always seemed to me a most appropriate way
of viewing the manner in which the continent and its
position within the international system is being studied,
and how it is being represented in scholarly as well as
popular writing. This is because there seems to be a
commonsense notion that the continent is largely peri -
pheral in a wider sociopolitical and economic global
reality, and that it should be treated as such in scholarly
accounts. More than that, the study of the continent –
at least in my own discipline of International Relations –
appears to be preceded by a particular ‘idea of Africa’,3
one that projects the continent as an aberrant ‘Other’,
the antithesis of the Westphalian institutional norm
upon which the current systemic order is built.
Therefore it is very striking how, as we enter the
second decade of the twenty-first century, there is a
marked change in international discourse on Africa.
Once described as ‘The Hopeless Continent’ by The
Economist in a leader article in 2000, it now appears as
if the continent is viewed in a much more positive light
by analysts, decision makers around the world and,
most noteworthy, by corporations. Probably one of the
most significant indicators of this change in tone is an
opinion piece in the inaugural edition for 2011 of the
same Economist, in which Africa is noted for being one
of the fastest growing regions of the globe, and six of
the continent’s best performing economies are labelled
the ‘lion kings’ of the world economy, placed by the
publication in the same category as the rapidly
advancing People’s Republic of China (PRC).4 Another
influential publication, Foreign Policy, phrased its analysis
of Africa’s growth outlooks even stronger, entitling its
leader article, ‘The African Miracle’.5 These publications
exemplify a shift in international attitude towards the
continent, in which Africa today appears to be viewed,
and in some instances is actively promoted, as a viable
investment destination. A new report by the World
Bank, for instance, lauds the continent as a growth
market for investors, particularly ‘new’ investors from
the emerging economies of the global South.6 This is
certainly a far cry from the Bank’s depictions of the
continent’s prospects at the start of the new millen -
nium, which augured a spiral into deep poverty if certain
proposed reforms were not implemented.7
How are we to understand this turn in international
discourse – for want of better terminology – from Afro-
pessimism and marginality to Afro-optimism? More im -
portantly, what substantively underlies it? Is it useful for
us to talk about a key historical moment in Africa’s
political and economic development? And are we wit -
nessing an elemental shift in Africa’s position in the
international system, one engendered by a greater sys -
temic dynamic (which some German colleagues would
call a Bruchzone) with attendant consequences for lived
realities on the continent?
In this talk I am both concerned with the pragmatic
question of the nature and implications of the forces (or
vectors) that are currently giving shape to Africa’s
political economy, as well as the related theoretical
ques tion of what it is that fundamentally underpins
them. The reference in the title to Fukuyama’s ‘end of
history’ is deliberate, for the suggestion is that, in order
to understand emergent tendencies in Africa’s political
economy, a perspective on what it is that historically
underlay growth and wealth is required. Thus, the
effects on the continent of new geopolitical dynamics
should be considered against the past dimensions,
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the world economy, and the substance of state and
capital on the continent. There is a larger context in
which changing international geographies of capital
prompt shifts in material and ideational conditions. For
the continent’s populations, however, structural reali -
ties and vulnerabilities remain unaltered.
EMERGENT VECTORS IN AFRICA’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Economic shifts
In a recent assessment of potential economic trajec -
tories in the wake of the global financial meltdown, the
World Bank outlined a major realignment of the world
economy in the decades ahead. It posited tectonic
shifts, with the centre of economic gravity gradually
moving from the G7 countries – their economies con -
tributing a decreasing proportion of world gross
domes tic product (GDP) – towards the BRIC states
(the alliance comprising Brazil, Russia, India and China)
and other smaller but equally important economies in
the global South.8 In various forecasts, Goldman Sachs,
which coined the term BRICs, has provided a similar
outlook, suggesting not only the eclipse of the G7 by the
BRICs, but also the rise of a next generation of major
players from the South (the so-called N-11, comprising
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam).9
Up to now, few of the multiple – and often contra -
dic tory – catalogues on emerging powers include African
states (Egypt, Nigeria and occasionally South Africa
being notable exceptions), underlining the predomi -
nance of the idea of Africa’s global marginality. This is an
idea that gained significant currency after the end of the
Cold War, encouraged by unfavourable appraisals of the
continent’s potential contribution to a world economy
that is being shaped by a progressively different set of
forces, and the continent’s seeming lack of importance
within a changing geopolitical context. Yet emergent
tendencies in African economic performance in the last
decade signal a different reality.
Since 2000, for instance, African growth has
accelerated by an average of 5.7%, making it one of the
world’s fastest growing regions.10 Some countries, such
as Angola, Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville and Mozambique,
have seen average annual growth in excess of 8 to 10%,
registering better growth performance than even the
PRC.
This is mainly due to the expansion of the industries
in the global commodity sector and the concomitant
rise in commodity exports by many African countries.
But growth in sectors such as telecommunications,
finance and tourism also points to significant diver sifi -
cation in Africa’s economic bases. As a result, the conti -
nent’s contribution to global output – even if much lower
than that of the world’s advanced economies11 – is
increasing. Other demographic tendencies – such as the
rise in consumer spending and the related expan sion of
groups with greater discretionary spending power – have
also been noted as indications of significant socio -
economic shifts by consultancies such as McKinsey.12 In
addition, a marked decline in the number of major inter-
state wars is seen to underscore the promising trends
in African development.
Medium-term effects of the global economic crises
Positive assessments of the economic prospects for the
continent are also motivated by the continent’s
apparent and paradoxical hardiness to the worst fallouts
of the global economic crises of 2008 to 2010. What
started out as an unexpected default by some of the
world’s largest financial institutions in the global North
soon mutated from a banking into a general and wide -
spread economic malaise, affecting international com -
mo dity prices, extractive industries, the availability of
domestic credit, economic growth prospects, labour
markets and, ultimately, livelihoods.
At the start of these crises in 2008, predictions were
that the African continent would be worst affected and
there were concerns that the tentative growth gains of
the previous decade would be derailed. Indeed, the
African Development Bank spoke of a ‘growth crisis’
that could degenerate into a long-term ‘development
crisis’.13
The effects of the global crises on the continent had
variable temporal dimensions. At first, oil-exporting
countries were affected by lowered world demand for
fuel and reduced commodity prices, while oil-importing
countries were exposed to the volatility of the global
resource sectors, lowered investor confidence and
capital flight.14 Countries that have had historically
higher levels of integration with the world economy,
such as South Africa, were generally more at risk and
experienced a wider portfolio of economic shocks.
During the first quarter of 2009, for instance, economic
output in South Africa declined by more than six
percent over the previous quarter, placing the country
in its first recession in twenty-five years. During that
7time, the mining sector reported large-scale cuts in its
labour force, a pattern that was replicated in South
Africa’s automotive industry and, in other African coun -
tries (e.g. Congo-Kinshasa, Zambia, Gabon, Botswana,
Madagascar, Tanzania and Mauritius), in industries such
as resource extraction and tourism.
Once the apex of the global crises had passed,
however, it was clear that the continent was less
affected than the emerging economies: initially, growth
in GDP slowed to 4%, and foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows were reduced by more than 20%. In
contrast, emerging economies experienced declines in
GDP growth to less than 2% and a decline of nearly 40%
in FDI.15 In part, Africa’s resilience was due to the
nature of the crises, underpinned by profound failures
in very specific parts of the global economy – advanced
futures markets, for instance – with which much of the
continent was not fully aligned. But Africa’s economies
were also shielded from the greatest shocks by
speculators’ later return to commodities as a means to
buffer shortfalls, thereby providing revenue for nume -
rous African countries. While not protecting it com -
pletely, the continent’s resource industries enabled it to
absorb much of the downturn in world economic
activity.16
Emerging powers and other geopolitical drivers
The role and impacts of new economic players on the
continent have of course also been instrumental in the
continent’s recent change of fortunes. Among the BRIC
states it is China in particular that has led the incursion,
with significant economic penetration. For instance, by
2010, Chinese trade with Africa was US$100bn,17
rivalling trade volumes between the continent and
several of its ‘traditional’ partners in the global North,
and Chinese FDI stock in Africa reached US$7.8bn.
India is a second major new actor in African economies
– Indian trade with the continent was valued at close on
US$40bn by 2009 – while corporations from countries
such as Brazil, South Korea, Japan and, to a lesser
extent Russia and some oil-rich Gulf states, are involved
in resource extraction, agriculture, manufacturing and
infrastructure development. South Africa is itself a
major economic actor on the continent and the pre -
sence of its multinational corporations is growing.18
Closer economic ties between the continent and
the BRIC states have had important diplomatic corre -
lates and outflows built around new multilateral
alliances, such as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA)
forum, which has grown in substance and vitality over
the years. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), started as a gathering of Chinese officials and
their African counterparts in 2000, has become the
hallmark of China’s engagement with the continent,
constituting a channel for the Asian power’s interests in
Africa. But the FOCAC process has also had a number
of other by-products, in the form of Chinese
scholarships and educational and research exchanges
and by facilitating cooperation in jurisprudence.
The new bilateral and multilateral relations arising
between Africa and several key emerging powers are
predominantly fashioned in terms of a provocative post -
colonial discourse that emphasises shared histories and
triumphs over colonialism, similar sociopolitical challen -
ges and common development agendas. This gives
shape to a burgeoning politics of South-South alignment
that amplifies the continent’s role in inter national
politics. By siding with other countries from the global
South, the continent influences inter national processes
around new issues such as global governance reform
and climate change. South Africa has emerged as
Africa’s principal advocate in most of the major
multilateral forums, being a member of the G20 (the
gathering of the finance ministers of the top 20 eco -
nomies in the world) and the G8’s Outreach 5 (or G5,
also comprising Brazil, China, India and Mexico). The
country’s inclusion in the climate change alliance
involving Brazil, India and China – the so-called BASIC
alliance – at the conclusion of the Conference of the
Parties meeting in Denmark at the end of 2009 provides
another diplomatic conduit for African representation.
Yet the rhetoric of South-South solidarity and the
purported convergence of interests also mask major
divergences and asymmetry between Africa and the
emerging powers. African economic output pales in
comparison with that of the emerging powers, and
while much is claimed about the lure of the continent’s
resources, it is the established economies of the global
North that draw most investments from these powers.
Overall, Africa south of the Sahara still accounts for a
fraction of world trade and global FDI inflows.19
Further, while emerging powers share the feature of
swift industrialisation and the concomitant rapid, if
uneven, societal transformation, they differ in important
respects – the structural underpinnings of their eco -
nomies, their types of political systems and their social
make-up, for instance. This leads them to set economic
and political objectives that address idio syncratic
domestic priorities that can be very different from
Africa’s interests. Within the continent, too, there 
are important asymmetries. South Africa’s recent
membership of the BRIC alliance underlines the
country’s prominence on the continent, but its self-
proclaimed leadership remains contested within African
diplomacy.20
Continued structural vulnerabilities
Thus, although there are important shifts under way in
the international system that help mediate the struc -
tural factors conditioning Africa’s place in the world
order, they do not alter it. A reflection on the hidden
impacts of the global economic crises on Africa helps
illustrate this. While the continent was relatively
shielded from the worst effects of the troubles in the
international financial system, it did not escape the
other facets of the crises: indeed, each time losses of
virtual capital spiralled into the real economy, affecting
global food and fuel prices, livelihoods, particularly in
the poorest parts of the continent, were concomitantly
affected.21 In this regard, the instabilities in the
international financial system had ramified, for Africa,
into a triple crisis of finance, food and fuel. Africa was
least immune to the rise in world food prices in 2008,
for instance, and the threat of a food crisis has been
persistent (which in the case of the Horn of Africa has
now materialised).
For the continent, the greatest threats of the eco -
nomic crises lay in the way in which they exacer bated
structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities, particularly in
vital sectors such as agriculture. While agencies such as
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
for instance, observed a greater degree of hardiness in
Africa’s financial markets, they did caution about the
long-term risks of the lack of social development. The
continent’s ability to meet social development targets,
contained in declaratory frameworks such as the
Millennium Development Goals (MDG), is questioned
even within the ranks of the United Nations. The UN’s
Millennium Development Summit of September 2010
had the message that, at existing levels of distribution,
poverty and vulnerability were likely to remain part of
the continent’s reality – especially for women and
children – for the foreseeable future.22 MDG health
targets in particular (child mortality, maternal health
and combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) are
far from being realised.23 Further, average life expec -
tancy in sub-Saharan Africa is not only still the lowest of
any part of the world, but falling in countries such as
South Africa, Congo-Kinshasa and Lesotho.24
The impacts of long-term ecological change are
likely to exacerbate such vulnerabilities. Even as the
science on climate change is highly contested, emerging
evidence suggests that the developing world is parti -
cularly susceptible to ecologically induced disasters,
which have grown less sporadic and more intense over
a short period. With its diverse ecologies, which still
form an important component of its economic foun -
dations, Africa is regarded as being especially at risk.25 It
is also the poor who are most affected by the increase
in environmental threats.
State and capital in Africa
Overall, inequalities have grown on the continent,
reflecting an aspect of Africa’s political economy that
stems from the particular configuration of statehood on
the continent, as well as the way in which capital is
generated and how that capital is distributed on the
continent. Indeed, it is useful to recall what the nature
has been of Africa’s assimilation into the world eco -
nomy over the past few decades and how it has been
shaped by the ideology and practices of neoliberalism,
which have underpinned global economic expansion
during this time. It is also important to consider how
that ideology has been mediated in different domestic
contexts on the continent.
Two substantive points can be made here. First,
neoliberalism – defined as a particular regime of accu mu -
lation and a supportive mode of regulation – provided a
motif for Africa’s integration into the wider inter -
national system. Second, although the naturali sation of
neoliberalism as a mode of governance has been sys -
tematic and wide-ranging over the past few decades, it
has varied in institutional form and longer-term impact
in different geopolitical settings. An important aspect of
Africa’s integration is thus the degree to which it was
fostered by and re-created a particular form of neo -
liberalism on the continent. 
In a general sense, as a process of institutio na li -
sation, neoliberalism at best only approximates the ideal
type reflected in the ideology: markets are never com -
pletely unfettered, the state is always partly present and
institutions and routines are adapted to help achieve
changeable policy outcomes. In addition, different forms
of neoliberalism are present in different parts of the
globe. In its diffusion and institutionalisation, the prin -
ciples of neoliberalism become refracted and are trans -
formed through various institutional layers of gover -
nance and the preferences and interactions of different
economic and social interest groups, leading to its
variegated character. These variations are both of degree
and type,26 varying in different contexts in the patterns
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9of capital accumulation in use, the actors involved and
the institutional arrangements giving shape to ex -
changes. The variations can also extend to the ideo -
logical edifice that defines neoliberalism, as political
actors give different meanings to neoliberal deregu -
lation, state withdrawal or policy adjustments.
Despite neoliberalism’s variegated nature, there
have been common elements in its international
expansion. In the global North, this generally entailed a
dual process of industrial and economic restructuring
and a mix of political and institutional realignments. The
latter can be depicted as a two-way (and contradictory)
process of rolling back institutional forms generally
asso ciated with Keynesianism, and rolling out ‘new state
forms, new modes of regulation, new regimes of gover -
nance, with the aim of consolidating and managing both
marketization and its consequences’.27 Paradoxically,
neoliberalism has often entailed the extension, rather
than contraction, of state institutions.
Roll-back and roll-out have also been associated with
the expansion of neoliberalism in the global South,
although this process has been more complex and pro -
tracted, has been shaped by a diverse range of factors,
both externally and internally derived, and has followed
the changing contours of the international aid paradigm.
In all, neoliberalism’s unfurling throughout the South
was in part the political face of economic globalisation,
by which international institutions played a significant
role in introducing and then normalising the values, if
not fully the practices, of neoliberalism. In the process,
a global neoliberalism was established, shaped by the
specific forms of North-South aid, loans and wider
economic interaction characteristic of the contempo -
rary economic system. But if this project was intended
to forge a particular kind of state28 – a polity in the image
of the liberal democratic and capitalist states of North
America and Western Europe – it was mediated by the
political conditions, collusions and interests it
encountered in target countries.
For instance, in both Africa and parts of Latin Ame -
rica, neoliberalism’s adoption followed years of eco -
nomic decline and the closer involvement of
International Financial Institutions (IFIs )in the national
economies of increasingly debt-dependent states. In
such contexts, the embrace of neoliberalism has been
widely viewed as involuntary and partial, and mainly
reflected in reforms to monetary and fiscal policies and
the reduction of state bureaucracies.29 Similarly, in the
rapidly industrialising states of much of East and
Southeast Asia, neoliberalism has tended to be applied
in the economic sphere only, with little serious adoption
of the politico-institutional transformation that accom -
panied neoliberalism’s adoption in the global North. In a
significant part of Asia, moreover, neo liberalism was
often no more than a rhetorical tool for the region’s
numerous soft authoritarian regimes.30
It is therefore useful to trace the unfolding of neo -
liberalism in the global South both through the inter nal
processes of modification that have given neo liberalism
there its idiosyncratic character, and through the wider,
external process of integration into the world economy
that those states have been subjected to as part of
globalisation. In all instances, while neoliberalism has
been applied in highly different formats, it has had the
common function of enabling local, and often over -
lapping, political and capitalist interest groups to link
with other collections of transnational capital. If any -
thing, therefore, neoliberal globalisation served as a con -
veyer belt for the transmission of values and the
legitimation of activities by local and international func -
tionaries that significantly changed the economies and
polities of the South, albeit it in highly contrasting ways.
The story conventionally told by scholars about
neoliberalism’s rise in Africa since the 1980s rightly
commences with the changing international orientation
to the continent’s development problematic at the time,
reflected both in shifts in thinking about the nature and
causes of the ‘problem’, and in the wider structure of
the agents charged with addressing it. Coming at a time
of extended decline and growing societal impoverish -
ment on the continent, sweeping assessments were
made in the international arena about the imperfections
of the modernist aid paradigm, the limitations of policies
implemented by the continent’s leadership, and the
underlying structural weaknesses of African economies.
The lexicon shifted: Africa’s situation was not only one
of deferred development, but of outright under -
development, and the solution proffered started with a
bold characterisation of the problem – the nature of the
state and its extensions of patronage institutionalised in
African societies. Inefficient and overextended state
bureaucracies had to be reduced,31 in the process –
although this was an implicit objective – removing the
ethnicised interests around which political and eco -
nomic patronage clustered.
The extensive series of Structural Adjustment
Programmes introduced on the continent by the World
Bank and IMF from the mid-1980s was primarily
intended to effect this change. The ideal was not only to
create a leaner, more efficiently functioning state, but
indeed to help fashion an altogether different state, in
which political authority was less personalised and
10
where economic authority vested in the market rather
than elsewhere. Infusing market discipline into eco no -
mic practices, however, was a later element of IFI de -
velopment policy, with initial interventions focused on
‘rolling back’ the African state,32 in much the same way
as was being attempted in the far-off capitals of the
Anglo-Saxon world. Although originating in the latter
locations, the neoliberal template was at that time still
only partly complete.33
In Africa, IFI-induced state restructuring pro -
grammes underwent significant changes in content, in -
ten tion and character, from the modest objectives of
whittling down the state to a fuller roster of goals to
redevelop and capacitate a kind of state able to oversee
the sectoral adjustments and economic right-balancing
deemed obligatory by World Bank calculations.
From the perspective of IFIs, this latter process of
‘roll-out’ focused on the creation of the de rigueur
institutional conditions – economic and societal – to
enable a market-driven economy to take root. The
change in emphasis in World Bank development policy
from the mid-1990s towards the adoption of specific
monetary and fiscal policies, investments in social
development to spark an entrepreneurial spirit, and the
introduction of systems and management logic to public
sectors, reflected an attempt to engender the kind of
market-focused adaptations that were evolving in the
North.34 It was accompanied by an ever-growing cata -
logue of conditionalities for proper – or good – gover -
nance, which, having congealed into a collective set of
ideas treasured by the Washington-based IFIs, also soon
infused all forms of large-scale bilateral and other
multilateral assistance to the continent. It is ironic that
this form of transnational, exteriorised and pro gressive
infiltration of neoliberalism into the African continent
helped to entrench a credit dependency that has 
sig nificant structural implications and impacts to this
day.
If this part of the narrative is familiar, the rest of the
story of neoliberalism’s varied spaces in Africa is less
well captured in scholarly accounts of neoliberal
develop ment on the continent. For along with the
external impetuses provided by IFI and other donor
interventions, neoliberalism also found other, en -
dogenous avenues of advancement and internalisation.
This occurred through a twofold process. First,
concomitant with the continent’s integration into the
world economy, political elites in certain states adopted
explicitly neoliberal agendas, either to enhance their
extraction of rent from certain resource sectors, or, as
in the case of South Africa, as a specific choice by natio -
nal rulers to create a particular economic foundation
that could support the type of political regime they
were trying to create.
The patterns varied. However, in many of Africa’s
resource-rich countries, the externalisation of those
resource sectors through aggressive export-driven
development, the promotion of foreign direct invest -
ment, or factor enhancement in specific regional spaces
helped a local elite link to world capitalist structures.
The export of oil (such as from Nigeria, more recently
from Angola and to a lesser degree from the Maghreb
states) or other commodities (metals and minerals
from, for instance, Congo-Kinshasa, Gabon, Botswana,
Namibia and latterly Equatorial Guinea) was the
predominant element in this externalised rent-seeking.
But it was also visible in the expansion of service
sectors in certain states.35 For most of those states,
rather than exemplifying a move to full liberalisation,
however, the elite’s embrace of neoliberalism was part
of a strategy to ‘diversify’ and externalise sources of
rent. The underlying character of the neopatrimonial
system did not change: rather it was adapted and en -
hanced by the securing of the rentier economy.36
The second part of the endogenisation of neo -
liberalism on the continent was through processes re -
lated to the New Partnership for Africa’s Develop ment
(NEPAD). The most important feature of NEPAD lies in
its commitment to change the systemic defects in
African political systems. The real implication of
NEPAD lies in how it embodies the collective accep -
tance of ‘good governance’ (operationalised in a series
of economic, corporate and political governance
initiatives) by Africa’s leadership, built on a new political
compact with the global North. The promises about a
move towards agency, responsibility and self-discipline -
even if largely rhetorical – represent the ultimate inter -
nalisation of neoliberalism’s principles as they have been
articulated through donor development policy since the
1980s. With its launch, NEPAD also set the stage for a
new era of aid relations between Africa and the North,
which, on the one hand, involved changes in the
modalities and goals of Northern assistance to the
continent and, on the other hand, the establishment of
new, multilateral institutions of ‘partnership’. Support
by Northern governments for NEPAD has been
registered, for instance, by the extension of debt re -
scheduling through the World Bank’s Highly Indebted
Poor Countries’ Initiative (the greater majority of the
beneficiaries being African states) and such programmes
as the G8 Africa Action Plan, which was adopted at the
2002 Kananaskis Summit.
Overall, neoliberalism’s appropriation by the
political elite on the continent was selective, volitional
and varied. Fractions of capitalist and political classes
adopted and drove neoliberal agendas for their own
interests and with varied structural and ideological
mani festations and impacts. Far from altering the neo -
patrimonial state, as it was intended to, the process of
neoliberal adaption in Africa was mediated and re -
shaped by the neopatrimonial state.37 Indeed, neo libe -
ralism’s spread in Africa, exogenously induced at first
but later endogenously, if partially, implemented, tended
to bring gains for a minority and little for the majority.
In the wake of the global crises, the evolving agenda
of global economic governance based on an ethics of
financial accountability and state regulation signals a
tweaked understanding of the function – although not
the purpose – of neoliberalism. While this agenda re -
quires the rules of the game to be tightened and en -
forced more effectively, it does not involve sub stantive
change to the rules. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS – 
A NEW AFRICAN DAWN?
By way of concluding, allow me to reflect on theimplications of all this for future trajectories on the
continent, but indeed also for how we study Africa’s
political economy. Recent signs of growth and tentative
trends of political reform have fostered a narrative of
change and promise, which advances that Africa is
poised for a new phase of development, one in which
the continent is not marginal and reactive, but an active
participant in the international system.
Emergent geopolitical dynamics certainly imply
important shifts that, in time, could have significant
ramifications – positive and negative – for the continent.
Yet there are structural conditions, even systemic
challenges, which could waylay the new African dawn
that the continent’s most strident boosters are
promoting. These include the possibility of recurrent
global economic instabilities, which can exacerbate the
continent’s debt dependence over the long term. They
also include the sharpening of income polarities, which,
in conjunction with the growing threats of ecological
disaster – cyclical drought provoked by climate change,
water wars – enhance societal insecurities. And while
Africa’s commodities recently helped sway the
continent’s growth fortunes, there is an overreliance on
mining and non-renewable energies. Changing global
energy economies – and the new post-Fukushima
politics around energy security – are certain to directly
affect the continent in the future.
Thus far, the rhetoric of ownership and partnership
espoused by the continent’s leadership under pro -
grammes such as NEPAD, enthusiastically supported by
the world’s richest countries, provided little of con -
crete value for the majority of the African popu lation.
This situation is unlikely to improve if the changes to
the neoliberal international order contained in new
articulations of the role of global economic governance
remain essentially decorative.
Finally, from an epistemological perspective, it is
useful to remind ourselves that there are multiple
Africas and multiple African realities. While the macro-
narrative of underdevelopment is slowly being replaced,
there are micro-narratives – of poverty, suffering, 
in equality and destituteness, but also of entrepre -
neurship, triumph and potential – that need further
uncovering.
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